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**NEAR/EAST AFRICA BRANCH
OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

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WORKING PAPER

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Greek resentment against Albania: Greek tempers have been aroused by the realization that, without considerable Albanian support, the guerrillas could not have launched so virulent an attack as the recent Grammos thrust. Several rightist newspapers in Athens have called for a punitive Greek military expedition against Albania, and even more sober Greek opinion demands action from the UN rather than mere reporting by the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB). Greek public feeling on this issue will be slow to cool unless unexpectedly effective international action is taken against Albania. The issue will undoubtedly serve as a rallying cry for rightist Greek politicians who have been partially eclipsed in the present coalition government, and, what is more serious, it will distract the attention of responsible Greeks from the important task of restoring economic and political well-being to their own country. Although Albanian support of the current Grammos drive represents no change in Soviet-Satellite policies, each of the northern neighbors may be expected to watch international reaction to this issue as closely as ever. If the case is ignored or mishandled by the UN or the Four Powers, Albania and Bulgaria may well feel free to stiffen their support of the Greek guerrilla movement.

Guerrilla government reshuffled: The announcement on 4 April of a reshuffled guerrilla government probably completes the official reorientation of the Greek Communists toward the Cominform, a change in course which apparently began with the dismissal of Markos in January. As promised at the NOF (Slavo-Macedonian) Congress in late March, the Greek Communists have expanded their government to include representatives of NOF and other front groups, presumably as a sop for continued collaboration in important frontier areas during the course of the Tito-Cominform quarrel.

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The new government represents no radical departure from previous guerrilla policies toward Greece. Although the guerrillas recognize the growing difficulties that they face, their command remains militant, as illustrated by the launching of a major effort in the Grammos area almost simultaneously with the announcement of the reshuffled government. The coincident proclamation of amnesty for the guerrillas' enemies and the reiteration of their willingness to make peace--on their own terms--are part of their stock of propaganda weapons, and offer nothing new. The Moscow orientation of the key figures in the reshuffled guerrilla government leaves little doubt that the guerrillas will pursue an aggressive policy so long as the Kremlin dictates.

TURKEY

Turkey and the Arabs: As the first primarily Moslem state to decide upon de facto recognition of Israel, Turkey might well have felt apprehensive about the reactions of its Arab neighbors. For several years, the Turkish Government has taken pains to develop and maintain friendly relations with the Arabs, if only to avoid becoming virtually surrounded by hostile states. By deliberately stressing its community of interest with its southern neighbors on such matters as border patrolling, extradition rights, and control of waterways, and by avoiding acrimonious argument over such points of dispute as the Syrian claim to the Turkish province of Hatay, the Turks achieved considerable success in this policy--a success which was made more sure by Turkey's vote in the General Assembly against the partition of Palestine.

Because of its stake in Near East stability, Turkey has since attempted to promote a settlement of the Palestine dispute, but it has moved cautiously in order to avoid alienating the Arabs. In urging that they come to terms with Israel, Turkish statesmen have stressed Arab self-interest, and in accepting a position on the Palestine Conciliation Commission, Turkey seemed to have assumed a role of strict neutrality. The decision to extend de facto recognition came sooner than was expected, and was no doubt hastened by the realization that over 40 nations had already done so and by the desire to create the friendliest possible atmosphere in Washington during Foreign Minister Sadak's highly important forthcoming visit. The Turks have doubtless been relieved of some of their apprehensions by the conspicuous absence of violent Arab reactions to the Turkish decision so far, but it is highly probable that Turkey will feel it desirable to make some friendly overtures to the Arabs in the near future.

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PALESTINE

Syrian armistice lags: A firm beginning on Syro-Israeli armistice talks has still to be made. Discussions were initially thrown off by the Israeli incursion across the Syrian frontier just north of Lake Hula last week-- a move which, on the basis of some Israeli statements, appears designed to gain bargaining leverage as against Syrian occupation of the Jewish settlement at Mishmar hay Yarden. The Israeli troops were reportedly withdrawn by the end of the week, following UN, US, and Syrian representations, but resumption of negotiations was again blocked when the Israeli representatives refused to consider Zaim's representatives as speaking for a validly constituted Syrian government. In spite of these setbacks, however, the prospects for an armistice seem fairly good, since both Tel Aviv and Damascus appear to favor the conclusion of a military settlement.

EGYPT

Coup unlikely: Contrary to current rumors, the possibility of an Egyptian coup d'etat, similar to that which took place in Syria, seems remote at present. Although the Wafd Party, representing a parliamentary majority, is in opposition to Prime Minister Abdel Hadi's Cabinet, neither it, the outlawed Moslem Brotherhood, nor the illegal Communist Party is in a position to overthrow the government. Only the strong-willed Minister of Defense, Haidar Pasha, offers any substantial threat either to the King or to the cabinet, and Haidar's chances of initiating a palace revolution seem dim so long as the army is hampered by disaffected elements within it, and the army and the police are at odds with each other.

SYRIA

Zaim's position improves: Colonel Zaim is slowly consolidating his position as Syria's "strong man." President Quwatli's resignation on 7 April, by lending a slight, ex post facto aspect of constitutionality to his forced vacation of the office, has removed one burr from Zaim's saddle; with Parliamentary elections scheduled to be held within the next 60 days, Zaim has now let it be known that he is prepared to bow to the will of the people if the new Parliament should offer the Presidency to him. Meanwhile, though most Syrian politicians continue to act cautiously about identifying

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themselves with the new regime thrust upon them, there is little doubt that their coyness will evaporate as Zaim's position becomes more secure. Thus far the only elements with serious cause to oppose Zaim (except for the old leaders he is holding in jail) are the Communists, whose initial delight over the downfall of Quwatli doubtless has been dampened by the anti-Communist policy the new regime has put into effect.

Zaim's international position is still anomalous, but there are indications that a large number of countries are prepared to recognize his regime as soon as one of the influential Western powers has broken the ice--a step which the Damascus representatives of the US, the UK, and France have strongly recommended to their governments. Most of the other Arab states have indicated that they consider the coup an internal affair, and only Israel, in interrupting armistice negotiations, has ventured to challenge Zaim's authority directly.

IRAN

Clarification of frontier sought: Iran is currently seeking a formula for determining precisely its northern frontier so as to remove any possible justification for Soviet aggression along the border. Foreign Minister Hekmat has been authorized to make three alternative proposals to Soviet Ambassador Sadchikov: (1) that Hekmat and Sadchikov attempt to reach prompt agreement on exact delineation of the disputed boundaries; (2) that an Irano-Soviet boundary commission (possibly with neutral participation) be formed to delineate the boundaries; or (3) that Iran submit a formal complaint to the Security Council based on the six acts of aggression committed by the Soviet Army during the past year. Both the first and second proposals represent a logical approach to solving the problem. The third, however, would undoubtedly be considered by the USSR as an attempt to exert pressure and would probably be defined as a "hostile act." Moreover, the submission of a specific complaint of this kind to the Security Council would reduce the effectiveness of the more important memorandum reviewing the whole course of recent Irano-Soviet relations which Iran is considering putting before the Security Council.

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NOTED IN BRIEF

The long-expected general strike of Greek Government employees over wage and price issues began 6 April, mainly in the Athens area, amid signs of wide public sympathy and a not unconciliatory attitude on the part of the government. Both strikers and government, realizing the underlying economic difficulties, are trying to keep the strike from endangering the military effort.

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Approbation continues to be the chief note in Turkish comment on the North Atlantic Pact. Most comments, however, follow up by reiterating the view that: (1) the inclusion of Italy belies the designation "Atlantic" (privately the Turks regard the inclusion of weakened Italy, with its large Communist minority, as something of an insult to them); (2) the treaty is "incomplete;" and (3) Turkey's claims for inclusion in an international security agreement of this sort are as valid as ever.

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The Sudan Legislative Assembly has defeated, 41-19, the proposal of Mohamed Maghoub, Secretary of the Independence Front, for a detailed program providing self-rule in or before 1956. The Assembly also defeated, 50-13, a proposal requiring foreign companies to maintain 50 percent Sudanese representation on their staffs. These two incidents indicate that while the British Administration at Khartoum supported the Independence Front last fall in the latter's opposition to Egyptian-Sudanese Union, it is not yet prepared to back the same party on a program of early and complete independence. The voting in the legislature also shows how effectively the British Administration controls the Sudanese Legislative Assembly.

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The Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) has expressed itself as being seriously disturbed over the clause in the Anglo-Egyptian Financial Agreement which provides that a greater percentage of Egypt's oil requirements is to be paid for in sterling. ARAMCO feels unable to

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accept sterling, since almost all payments by the company must be in dollars. ARAMCO also realizes that world petroleum shortages are easing, bringing nearer the day when marketing problems will bulk large in the company's operations. An ARAMCO official states that it is now planned to maintain production at the 500,000 BPD rate, rather than to follow a program of continued expansion.

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Although the Israel Government was severely criticized by both left and right wing parties for its acceptance of the armistice with Transjordan, the government won a 64-15 vote of confidence in the Assembly. The right-wing Herut Party dissented and the Communists and left-wing socialist of MAPAM abstained.

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The Arab refugees may be joined by the 35,000 inhabitants of the 16 north-central Palestine villages which passed to Israeli control under the Transjordan-Israeli armistice. Although the armistice provides that the villagers "shall be protected in their full rights of residence, property, and freedom," the villagers have not been directly informed of this guarantee and they fear that the Israelis will take over their possessions. Transjordan plans to publicize these assurances in the villages affected, but Israel has as yet made no move to reaffirm the guarantee publicly.

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The Shah of Iran wishes to visit the US now instead of waiting until autumn. The projected visit, unlike his trip to England last summer, would be in the nature of a "state visit." The Shah's position in his own country is more powerful than at any other time during his seven-year reign, and he might well approach the US with something of the attitude of *l'etat c'est moi*. Uppermost in his mind is the question of US support for Iran, including a build-up of the Iranian Army and a commitment on the action to be taken by the US if the Soviet Army should invade Iran, and only Iran.

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The Shah has evinced keen disappointment that his answers to an INS query on Irano-Soviet relations were not more widely published. In the "interview," the Shah pointed out that, while Iran had no aggressive intentions vis-a-vis the USSR and was currently taking purely defensive security measures, it would consider Soviet invocation of Article VI of the 1921 Treaty as an act of aggression. The Shah concluded that the Soviets should provide an answer to the question "What can the USSR do to preserve peace in Iran's part of the world?"